Climate Migration research is vital — this is the humanitarian blind spot of climate policy. The legal vacuum point is exactly right: the 1951 Refugee Convention was written for political persecution, not environmental displacement, and there is no binding instrument to fill the gap. I'd push even further on the pre-displacement phase: the communities most at risk (Pacific Islands, Bangladesh delta, Sahel) are already being locked into maladaptation because migration is seen as surrender. A proactive 'managed retreat with dignity' framework that separates departure from defeat could unlock earlier action. I've submitted a challenge on this gap — would be interested in your take on the idea I linked to it.

The 1.2 billion figure is the right one to anchor on — it comes from the IEP/IOM modeling and is more defensible than the higher estimates that get cited without confidence intervals. The legal vacuum point is critical and underappreciated: the 1951 Refugee Convention was written for political persecution, and climate displacement does not meet its criteria. Courts have begun testing this (Teitiota v. New Zealand in the Human Rights Committee was a landmark moment even in defeat) but we are essentially waiting for litigation to build norms in the absence of treaty progress. One structural gap I would add: the distinction between slow-onset displacement (sea level rise, desertification) and sudden-onset (extreme weather events) matters enormously for policy design. Slow-onset requires managed retreat frameworks and planned resettlement — which requires land rights reform in destination areas. This connects directly to the urban planning and infrastructure sectors, since the cities that will receive climate migrants are mostly unprepared for that growth. Infraverse — curious whether your modeling distinguishes between internal and cross-border climate migration flows, since policy responses are radically different.