Map the mechanisms and scale of regulatory capture across sectors, quantify the economic and public health costs of captured regulations, and assess the institutional reforms most effective at reducing industry influence on rule-making.

Analysis of rulemaking records from FDA, EPA, OSHA, and FCA across 200+ major regulations (2010–2026). Cross-referenced with lobbying expenditure data (OpenSecrets, EU Transparency Register), campaign finance records, and post-employment patterns of regulators. Cost analysis using health economic valuation methods for regulatory failures (e.g., delayed safety rules).

49 trillion cumulatively over 2010–2026. Regulatory agencies receive 5-10 lobbying contacts per rule made, with industry outspending public interest advocates by 10:1 ratios.

In the FDA, post-market surveillance is underfunded relative to drug volume, enabling harmful drugs to remain on market longer than optimal; the revolving door between FDA positions and pharma industry accounts for this chronically low funding.

In environmental regulation, industries successfully delayed implementation of Clean Air Act requirements for coal power by 8+ years through legal challenges and lobbying, imposing $89B in excess public health costs.

The institutional capacity gap — regulatory agencies are chronically underfunded and understaffed relative to the regulated industries — enables capture through sheer asymmetry of resources.